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IS THE SKY THE LIMIT? 

HON. MARK A. COSTANTINO'" 
VITO A. CANNAVO"'''' 
ANN GOLDSTEIN"''''''' 
To most observers, Sylvia Mendenhall appeared to be a typi­
cally nervous air traveler. Her behavior, however, was viewed as 
suspect by agents who believed that it fit the pattern of a drug cou­
rier. I She arrived on a flight from Los Angeles, a drug source city;2 
she was the last person to deplane and appeared very nervous;3 
she scanned the entire area;4 she proceeded past the baggage area 
without claiming any luggage;5 and she changed airlines for her 
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1. United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1873 n.l (1980). 
2. A source city is a city from which drugs are shipped to other points for sale 
or further distribution. Source cities include, inter alia, Miami, Florida; Los Angeles, 
California; and Chicago, Illinois. See United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1342 
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2991 (1980); United States V. Vasquez­
Santiago, 602 F.2d 1069, 1072 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 
1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 719-20 (6th Cir. 
1977); United States V. Scott, 545 F.2d 38, 39 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
1066 (1977). 
3. See United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1342 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 100 S.Ct. 2991 (1980); United States v. Vasquez-Santiago, 602 F.2d 1069, 
1072 (2d Cir. 1979); United States V. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 496 (2d Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 
913,914 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Chatman, 573 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1977); 
United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 720 (6th Cir. 1977). 
4. See United States V. Forero-Rincon, 626 F.2d 218, 222 (2d Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 
2991 (1980); United States v. Vasquez-Santiago, 602 F.2d 1069, 1071 (2d Cir. 1979). 
5. See United States v. Forero-Rincon, 626 F.2d 218, 222 (2d Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1343 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2991 
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flight out of Detroit. 6 Based upon that behavior pattern, agents of 
the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) stopped Sylvia 
Mendenhall, asked her for identification, brought her to the airport 
drug enforcement office, and searched her person. 7 Subsequently, 
Sylvia Mendenhall was arrested, indicted, and convicted for pos­
session of heroin. 8 Presented with these facts, the United States 
Supreme Court held that Sylvia Mendenhall's fourth amendment 
rights were not violated when she was detained and questioned by 
the drug enforcement agents. 9 
The validity of the procedures used by agents in stopping do­
mestic airline passengers who exhibit behavior characteristic of 
drug couriers remains an open questionlO despite the recent deci­
sion in United States v. Mendenhall.ll This article analyzes the 
constitutionality of stopping people in airports solely because their 
appearance and behavior correspond to traits listed in a "drug cou­
rier profile."12 The propriety of such law enforcement action will 
be viewed in light of the fourth amendment13 requirements and 
the standards which have developed in the area of stop-and-frisk. 14 
(1980); United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494, 496 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Rico, 594 F.2d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 
(5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1978); United 
States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 719-20 (6th Cir. 1977). 
6. See United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 914 (5th Cir. 1978); United States 
v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 60 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Riggs, 474 F.2d 699, 703 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820 (1973). 
7. United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1873-74 (1980). 
8. Id. at 1874. 
9. Id. at 1873. 
10. The issue has arisen in many cases before many courts. See United States v. 
Forero-Rincon, 626 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 
615 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2991 (1980); United States v. Vasquez-Santiago, 602 F.2d 
1069 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Beck, 598 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Mendenhall, 596 F.2d 
706 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd & remanded, 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980); United States v. 
Smith, 574 F.2d 882 (6th Cir, 1978); United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 
1978); United States v. Chatman, 573 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Scott, 
545 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977); United States v. Diaz, 
503 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1974). 
ll. 100 S. Ct. 1870 (1980). See notes 91, 92, 119 & 121 infra and accompanying 
text. 
12. See notes 44-63 infra and accompanying text. 
13. See generally Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 
338 U.S. 160 (1949). 
14. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 
U.S. 40 (1968). See also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). 
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1. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE TERRY STOP 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guar­
antees that no arrest will be made without probable cause. 15 This 
guarantee provides not only one of the most fundamental protec­
tions under the law,16 but it also guides the daily interaction be­
tween law enforcement officials and suspected criminal offenders. 17 
The essential purpose of the fourth amendment proscriptions is to 
impose a standard of reasonableness on the exercise of discretion 
by government officials. 18 This requirement of reasonableness 
varies with the degree of governmental intrusion upon personal 
freedom. III When the official intrusion is an arrest,20 the full pano­
ply of fourth amendment protections is summoned. 21 Specifically, 
probable cause must exist before an arrest may occur.22 It is well 
established that an officer has probable cause to arrest at the mo­
ment when the facts and circumstances within his knowledge, and 
of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient 
15. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). The fourth amendment to the 
United States Constitution reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio­
lated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
16. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891). The Court stated that 
"[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, 
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, 
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable 
authority of law." [d. at 251. 
17. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 
629-35 (1965). 
18. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979). See also Brown v. 
Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
19. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-55 (1979); United States v. 
Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 
555 (1976); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960). See also Marshall v. 
Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439 
(1973); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). 
20. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979). The Dunaway Court ex­
plained that only brief and narrowly circumscribed instrusions may be judged by a 
standard other than that required for arrests. [d. at 212. 
21. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949); Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A 
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 437-76 (1978). 
22. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 
(1967); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 
(1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). 
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to warrant a prudent person to believe that an offense has been or 
is being committed. 23 While the standard of probable cause is sim­
ple to state, its meaning takes form only after an analysis of the un­
derlying circumstances of each particular case. 24 The standard is 
not technical in nature; rather, it is designed to address the factual 
and practical considerations of everyday life. 25 In essence, the gen­
eral requirements of the fourth amendment and its specific re­
quirement of probable cause are based upon a "quantum of evi­
dence" standard. 26 
While the boundary lines of probable cause gradually crystal­
lized,27 a second issue arose concerning the permissible scope of 
interaction between law enforcement officials and citizens. 28 Un­
certainty developed over the circumstances which would justify po­
lice activity in the absence of facts supporting a finding of pmbable 
cause to arrest. 29 In light of the fourth amendment's purpose to 
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against unreason­
23. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
24. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). For example, probable cause may be 
established solely on the basis of information from an informant, or on such informa­
tion and some corroborating facts. See, e.g., Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 
(1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). 
25. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). The Brinegar Court stated 
that the rule of probable cause is a practical conception which accommodates 
opposing interests. "Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To al­
low less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or 
caprice." Id. at 176. 
26. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34 (1963); Draper v. United States, 358 
U.S. 307 (1959); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958). When the consti­
tutional validity of an arrest is challenged, it is the function of the court to determine 
whether the facts establish probable cause. Courts will examine what the agent or in­
formant saw, heard, smelled, or otherwise perceived. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 94 
(1964). 
27. By way of example, case law indicates that where probable cause is based 
upon an informant's information, the government must show: (1) That the informant 
was credible and (2) that the informant received his information in a reliable way. 
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The underlying circumstances, including those 
portions of the information verified by the police, may be considered in determining 
whether the information supplied was sufficient to constitute probable cause. United 
States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971); United States v. Miley, 513 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842 (1975); United States v. McCoy, 478 F.2d 176 (10th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 828 (1973). 
28. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
29. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 
(1968). Terry, for example, involved a brief, on-the-spot stop on the street and a frisk 
for weapons, a situation that did not fit comfortably within the traditional concept of 
an arrest. 392 U.S. at 1. 
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able invasions by government officials,30 it was unclear whether the 
seizure of a person without probable cause was per se unreason­
able. 31 
In the 1968 decision of Terry D. Ohio,32 the United States Su­
preme Court clarified some of these issues by analyzing encounters 
between citizens and police which fell short of an arrest in fourth 
amendment terms. 33 The Terry decision established that a police 
officer may stop and question a person upon less than probable 
cause. 34 While' a particular contact may not amount to a technical 
arrest, the intrusion may be considered a fourth amendment sei­
zure and thus be subject to the amendment's reasonableness re­
quirement. 35 Accordingly, under Terry, the reasonableness of in­
vestigatory stops is to be decided on the facts of the particular 
case. 36 The Court explained that in making an assessment of the 
30. See generally United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); Cardwell v. 
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Gillard v. Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Tripp, 468 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 910 (1973). 
31. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Brinegar v. United States, 338 
U.S. 160 (1949). 
32. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
33. The Terry Court explained that "[t]he distinctions of classical 'stop-and­
frisk' theory thus serve to divert attention from the central inquiry under the Fourth 
Amendment-the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular govern­
mental invasion of a citizen's personal security." Id. at 19. Thus, the Court rejected 
the notion that the fourth amendment did not come into playas a limitation upon po­
lice conduct if the officers stop short of a technical arrest. Id. See also People v. 
Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 445, 201 N.E.2d 32, 34, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461 (1964), cert. 
denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965). 
34. See also Delaware v, Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1975); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
873,878 (1975); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969). 
35. The Terry Court explained that the sound "course is to recognize that the 
Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents ... and to make the scope of the 
particular intrusion in light of all the exigencies of the case, a central element in the 
analysis of reasonableness." 392 U.S. at 18 n.15. See also Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 
434 U.S. 106 (1977); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). The Court in Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) 
warned that: 
[T]o argue that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the investigatory 
stage is fundamentally to misconceive the purposes of the Fourth Amend­
ment. Investigatory seizures would subject unlimited numbers of innocent 
persons to the harassment and ignominy incident to involuntary detention. 
Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to pre­
vent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry, 
whether these intrusions be termed "arrests" or "investigatory detentions." 
Id. at 726-27. 
36. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Brignoni­
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). 
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reasonableness of a particular stop, it is imperative that the facts be 
weighed against an objective standard. 37 When an intrusion is min­
imal,38 the facts upon which the intrusion is based must meet an 
objective, but less stringent, standard of reasonable suspicion. 39 
Thus, under the Court's holding in Terry, a stop is justified under 
the fourth amendment if specific, articulable facts and the sur­
rounding circumstances demonstrate that the intrusion was based 
upon reasonable suspicion. 40 
The potential impact of Terry was unclear.41 Had the Court 
expanded the reach of constitutional regulation in order to place 
limits upon police action, or had the Court weakened the scope of 
fourth amendment safeguards? While permissible police activity 
37. 392 U.S. at 21-22. See also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Dela­
ware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978). The 
Brown Court explained that a central concern of the Constitution is to assure that an 
individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions. 
"To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on spe­
cific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require the seizure 
of the particular individual. ..." 443 U.S. at 51. 
38. It is essential to realize that Terry defined a special category of fourth 
amendment seizures which were substantially less intrusive than arrests. 392 U.S. at 
10. See also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 
(1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
39. 392 U.S. at 21. The theory is explained in People v. Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 
445,201 	N.E.2d 32, 34, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458, 461 (1964): 
[Tlhe evidence needed to make the inquiry is not of the same degree of 
conclusiveness as that required for an arrest. The stopping of the individual 
to inquire is not an arrest and the ground upon which the police may make 
the inquiry may be less incriminating than the ground for an arrest. 
40. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); United States v. Magda, 547 
F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Santana, 485 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974). The demand for specificity in the information upon 
which police action is predicated is the essential teaching of fourth amendment juris­
prudence. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,96 (1964); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 
23, 34-37 (1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-84 (1963); Dra~er v. 
United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1959); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 
15-17 (1948); United States v. Di RE, 332 U.S. 581,593-95 (1948). 
41. Compare United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1870 with Dunaway v. 
New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) and Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). See also 
Burkofl', Non-Investigator!! Police Encounters, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 681 
(1978); Telling, Arrest and Detentioll-The Conceptual .'.-faze, 1978 CRIM. L. REV. 
320; Note, Modem Approach to the Fourth Amendmellt: The Recollciliation of Indi­
vidual Rights With Governmental Interests, 39 LA. L. REV. 623 (1979); Comment, 
The Theory of Probable Cause and Searches of Illnocellt Persons: The Fourth 
Amendment and Stanford Daily, 25 UCLA L. REV. 1445 (1978); Comment, Terry 
Revisited: Critical Update on Recent Stop-and-Frisk Developments, 1977 WIS. L. 
REV. 877. 
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was broadened, -t2 such activity was conversely circumscribed by 
the dictates of the Constitution. 43 
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE AIRPORT STOP 
Recently, a new perspective has emerged concerning the cir­
cllmstances which justifY police activity in the absence of facts to 
support a finding of probable cause. 44 Specifically, the quantum of 
evidence necessary to sustain a valid Terry stop is being tested in 
the context of investigatory stops of domestic airline passengers. 45 
The question raised by such airport stops is whether the expertise 
of an officer and an agency can support a Terry stop. 
Faced with a growing dfllg trade, the DEA has developed 
new methods of identifYing potential narcotics violators. 46 One 
such method employed at airports is a "drug courier profile."47 The 
profile is a loose grouping of characteristics which indicate to an ex­
perienced agent that an airline passenger may be involved in illicit 
drug activity.48 Among the factors incorporated into the profile are: 
42. 392 U.S. at 26-27. See also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); United 
States v. Magda, 547 F.2d 756 (2d Cir. 1976). 
43. The Terry Court emphasized that: 

[W]e deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift ac­

tion predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the 

beat-which historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, 

subjected to the warrant procedure. Instead, the conduct involved in this 

case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against 

unreasonable searches and seizures. 

392 U.S. at 20. See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27 (1969). 
44. See notes 51-55 infra and accompanying text. 
45. See United States v. Forero-Rincon, 626 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Vasquez, 
612 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2991 (1980); United States V. 
Vasquez-Santiago, 602 F.2d 1069 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494 
(2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Beck, 598 F.2d 497 (9th Cir. 1979); United States V. 
Mendenhall, 596 F.2d at 706; United States v. Roundtree, 596 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 
1979); United States V. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Smith, 574 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 
1978); United States v. Chatman, 573 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1977); United States V. 
McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Scott, 545 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977); United States v. Diaz, 503 F.2d 1025 (3d 
Cir. 1974). 
46. See, e.g., United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1978). 
47. See United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1980); 
United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973 (2d Cir. 1978); United States V. Ballard, 573 
F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977). 
48. Similarly, in United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), the 
Court detailed several factors involved in determining whether there is reasonable 
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Use of small denomination currency for ticket purchases; travel 
to or from cities which are major sources of illegal drugs; excessive 
nervousness; loose fitting or bulky clothing; inadequate luggage; 
avoidance of travel companions; and evasive or contradictory an­
swers. 49 At first blush, many of the characteristics appear to be 
more consistent with innocent behavior than with specific facts in­
dicating criminal activity. 50 The checklist, however, is considered 
to be a barometer of criminal behavior: when .an individual's char­
acteristics match those listed, a Terry stop is justified. 51 Moreover, 
the checklist stands as a guide for the conduct of enforcement 
agents. 
In light of the profile's accusatory nature, two questions must 
be addressed. The first question is whether the drug courier profile 
sufficiently demonstrates the articulable, objective facts required to 
justifY a Terry investigatory stop. 52 The second question is whether 
institutional expertise and the collective experience of an agency 
can constitute specific and articulable facts. At issue is the point at 
which the fourth amendment draws a line between constitutional 
stops based upon reasonable suspicion and unconstitutional stops 
based either upon a trained agent's subjective hunch53 or upon al­
leged institutional expertise. 
An examination of the most recent cases demonstrates that 
while the profile is recognized as a useful tool for law enforcement, 
the notion that the profile alone constitutes a sufficient basis for 
instituting a Terry stop has been rejected. 54 In the area of airport 
suspicion to stop a car near an international border. Officers may consider: Charac­
teristics of the area in which they encounter a vehicle, evasive patterns of driving, 
and aspects of the vehicle itself. I d. at 884-85. 
49. See notes 2-6 supra. 
50. See United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1980); 
United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 719-20 (6th Cir. 1977). 
51. Courts reason that some patterns of behavior which may seem innocuous to 
the untrained eye may not appear so innocent to the trained officer who has 
witnessed similar scenarios. Compare United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1343 
(2d Cir. 1979) and United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 61 (2d Cir. 1977) with United 
States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1979). For a discussion of these three cases, see 
note 64 infra. 
52. See text accompanying note 40 supra. 
53. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 22. See also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 
(1964); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 
98 (1959); United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1980). In Brown 
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), the Court cautioned that there must be a line separating 
investigatory stops supported by objective facts from those stops which take place at 
the unfettered discretion of officers. [d. at 51. 
54. See, e.g., United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1979); 
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stops, courts have opposed using the profile as the sole basis for 
detennining when to initiate a drug investigation and instead have 
decided to view the totality of suspicious factors, including those 
which make up a drug courier profile. 55 This stance is consistent 
with the requirements of the fourth amendment and with the ex­
pectations of Terry: minimal governmental intrusions which do not 
constitute an arrest must be judged by a balancing test. 56 Indeed, 
the central inquiry under the fourth amendment, when limited 
stops and minimally intrusive behavior are involved, is the reason­
ableness of the particular governmental intrusion upon a citizen's 
personal security in light of all the circumstances. 57 Thus, while 
some degree of suspicion is a prerequisite to a valid governmental 
intrusion, the fourth amendment does not demand a fixed quantum 
of evidence to support a finding of reasonable suspicion. 58 Indeed, 
the essence of the Terry holding is that the reasonableness of a 
stop should be determined by the facts of each case. 59 Viewed in 
this light, the reasonableness of law enforcement conduct can be 
determined only by measuring the totality of relevant facts for each 
case against an objective standard of review. 
Sole dependence on a checklist of characteristics, however, 
emasculates the requirement that an officer view the totality of the 
United States v. Roundtree, 596 F.2d 672, 674 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Rico, 
594 F.2d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 1979). Courts explain that the need for a stop depends 
upon such factors as the seriousness of the offense, the consequence of delay, and 
the likelihood of the detainee's involvement in the offense. E.g., United States v. 
Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1342 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2991 (1980). 
Thus, the determination of reasonableness is reached by balancing the need for the 
stop against the gravity of the intrusion. United States v. Magda, 547 F.2d 756 (2d 
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21). 
Such balancing takes into account governmental and private interests. United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). Terry teaches that only specific and 
articulable facts can be considered in striking the balance between competing inter­
ests. 392 U.S. at 21. 
55. See United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1980); 
United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977). 
56. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 
(1979). See also Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). See 
generally notes 18-26 & 32-40 supra. 
57. 392 U.S. at 21. See also United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Berger v. New York, 388 
U.S. 41 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). See generally notes 
35-40 supra. 
58. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). See generally note 
26 supra. 
59. 392 U.S. at 19. 
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circumstances when making an informed, independent determina­
tion or criminal activity.60 Concomitantly, undue reliance upon an 
agent's subjective articulation of suspicious circumstances, based 
lIpon a prepackaged checklist of characteristics, weakens the con­
straints on unfettered police conduct and limits the extent of re­
view by the courtS. 61 Accordingly, courts have been loath to sanc­
tion a system of law enforcement based upon a national profile 
which serves as a substitute for an agent's determination that a 
crime is about to be, or has been, committed. 62 Thus, the require­
ment of specific and articulable facts, beyond the mere recitation of 
a uniform . list of traits, has not been discarded explicitly by the 
courts. 63 
In essence, the dilemma that the courts face involves an im­
plicit struggle between constitutional safeguards and institutional 
expertise. On the one hand, the Terry requirement of specific and 
articulable facts prevents unregulated police intrusion. On the 
other hand, the profile is the product of a governmental agency's 
expertise, developed from its aggregate of experience. It is argued 
that the agency's expertise alone can meet the specific and 
articulable facts standard established by Terry. Indeed, if the agen­
cy's expertise were not deferred to, agency guidelines designed to 
protect the public from capricious action could be unde~ined. 
60. Minimal intrusions, since Terry, have been sanctioned on the basis of an 
analysis of governmental and private interests and the scope of the intrusion. Such a 
balance is examined in light of objective facts presented to the court that the particu­
lar individual is involved in criminal activity. Thus, the basis of police action is such 
that it can be reviewed judicially by an objective standard. See Brown v. Texas, 443 
U.S. 47, 51 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); Scott v. 
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1968); United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320·(2d Cir. 
1979). 
61. 392 U.S. at 17-18. The Terry Court illustrated the dangers of excluding from 
constitutional regulation the initial phases of police conduct by examining the course 
of the adjudication in the New York Court of Appeals. Specifically, in People v. 
Rivera, 14 N.Y.2d 441, 201 N.E.2d 32, 252 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 
978 (1965), the court held that a frisk was not a search. In a later case, People v. 
Taggart, 20 N.Y.2d 335, 229 N.E.2d 581, 283 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1967), the court recognized 
that what it had authorized in Rivera was a search upon less than probable cause. 
Yet, it still defined search as it had in Rivera and merely noted that the cases which 
had upheld police intrusions went far beyond the original limited concept of frisk. In 
failing to consider limitations upon the scope of searches in individual cases as a po­
tential mode of regulation, the court of appeals arrived at the position that the Con­
stitution must be held to permit unrestrained rummaging about a person and his ef­
fects upon mere suspicion. Id. at 340, 229 N.E.2d at 585, 283 N.Y.S.2d at 6. See 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 18 n.15. 
62. See note 50 supra. 
63. See notes 54 & 55 supra. 
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Thus, courts are faced with the issue of when the expertise 
and experience of an institution, in and of itself, can constitute spe­
cific and articulable facts. This basic question has been masked by 
the courts in either of two ways. First, judicial decisions have 
tended to discuss at length the requirements of the specific and 
articulable facts standard. As will be explored, those facts which 
have been found to satisfy the constitutional requirements for a 
stop clearly resemble the characteristics of the agency's drug pro­
file. Courts consequently sidestep the issue of whether the profile 
alone may justify a stop. Second, some courts hold that questioning 
by agents in airports does not constitute a stop or seizure and thus 
does not implicate the fourth amendment. In this situation courts 
need not address whether a drug courier profile meets the Terry 
specific and articulable facts standard. Whether the first or second 
approach is followed, one result is clear: when minimally intrusive 
investigatory behavior is involved, Terry's safeguards will be weak­
ened unless the courts directly confront the issue of whether 
agency expertise should prevail over a suspect's constitutional 
rights. 
III. TERRY'S METAMORPHOSIS 
It is submitted that the requirement of specific and articulable 
facts is meaningless if any list of suspicious circumstances compiled 
by an agent will meet the Terry standard. A reading of a few rep­
resentative cases reveals the position taken by the courts with re­
gard to the quality of evidence which constitutes specific and ob­
jective facts64 sufficient to warrant an airport stop. 
64. In light of the fact that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit has been vocal in the area of airport stops, its cases are particularly instruc­
tive. A survey of three such cases decided within a span of three years indicates that 
fewer and fewer objective facts are needed to satisfy the threshold of reasonable sus­
picion. In United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977), the agent was thor­
oughly familiar with the defendant's reputed background in illicit drug peddling. 
The defendant was travelling with a person who was obviously a narcotics addict. 
They appeared nervous and avoided any appearance of knowing each other. The 
agent noticed distinct bulges in the clothing of the defendant's travelling companion. 
The defendant had just come from a rendezvous with a man personally known to the 
agent as being involved in the drug culture. Based upon these facts, the court con­
cluded that the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion. The court explained that, 
when the circumstances were considered as a whole, there were far too many inter­
related factors to have been the result of pure coincidence. [d. at 61. 
Two years later, the Second Circuit dealt with the facts of a second airport stop. 
In United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1979), the relevant circumstances in­
cluded: A defendant who walked with an odd gait; three companions, who travelled 
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The specific and articulable facts enunciated in the most re­
cent cases closely resemble the characteristics of a drug courier 
profile. 65 For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, in United States v. Forero-Rincon,66 found an air­
port stop to be based upon reasonable suspicion because the sus­
pects arrived from a source city, carried identical, untagged bags, 
tried to appear separate, scanned the airport, looked behind them, 
reunited after leaving the terminal, continued to look back toward 
the lobby after exiting, and accelerated their pace after observing a 
plainclothes agent.67 The Rincon court explained that the arrival 
from the source city of Miami, the untagged shoulderbags, the fur­
tive whispers, and the concerted attempt to appear separate pro­
vided the agent with more than a subjective hunch that the two 
suspects were involved in narcotics trafficking. 68 
with unmarked luggage and who constantly looked and nodded at each other, yet 
gave the appearance of being separate; and one defendant, who for no apparent rea­
son, volunteered an explanation for his presence at the airport. The court found that 
the stop was not justified by reference to the "profile"; rather, the conduct observed 
would have made an experienced officer suspect that the travellers were transporting 
narcotics. ld. at 326. Yet, the court cautioned that the set of characteristics outlined 
by the agent had little specifiable content and "only narrowly sufficed" to justify a 
stop. ld. at 325. The decision emphasized that a "check list of recurrent characteris­
tics can do no more than alert a special agent to initiate surveillance. More is re­
quired to warrant the intrusion of an investigative stop." Id. at 326. 
Finally, in United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 100 S. Ct. 2991 (1980), the court listed eight observations which, taken as a 
whole, amounted to reasonable suspicion: (1) The two suspects arrived on a flight 
from Chicago, a "source" city; (2) the suspects were the last to disembark; (3) the 
suspects, while travelling together, tried to appear separate; (4) they walked in tan­
dem and frequently glanced behind and scanned the airport; (5) their bags bore no 
identification; and (6) one suspect approached the other to correct the destination 
given by the companion to a skycap and then immediately moved away. The reason­
ableness standard of Terry was recited but then the court concluded that the com­
posite picture appeared "sufficiently suspicious, at least to the trained eye" of a drug 
enforcement agent. ld. at 1343. 
65. Compare United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d CiT. 1977) and United 
States v. Chatman, 573 F.2d 565 (9th CiT. 1977) and United States v. Scott, 545 F.2d 
38 (8th CiT. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977) with United States v. Forero­
Rincon, 626 F.2d 218 (2d CiT. 1980) and United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 
F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1980) and United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2991 (1980) and United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 
1870 and United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717 (6th Cir. 1977). It is submitted that 
while the former group of cases present to the court an array of specific, articulable 
facts, the latter do little more than recite the characteristics endemic to a drug cou­
rier profile. 
66. 626 F.2d 218 (2d CiT. 1980). 
67. [d. at 222. 
68. Id. at 222-24. 
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The absence of objective facts, other than those traits 
constituting a profile, raises the question of the vitality of Terry in 
the corridors of an airport. 69 As fact patterns repeat themselves and 
the drug courier profile becomes established as the basis for nar­
cotics arrests, the proposition emerges that special police conduct 
in airports falls outside the requirements of the fourth amend­
ment. 70 Examination of the specific and articulable facts which 
have been presented to the courts reveals that the Terry standard 
is being diluted to include the course of conduct practiced by drug 
enforcement agents at airports. 71 Most Significantly, this newly 
conceived test of reasonableness, which is based upon what has be­
come a profile system of law enforcement, leaves the Terry balanc­
ing analysis behind. 72 
In finding a valid Terry airport stop, despite the paucity of ob­
jective facts, courts stress the limited scope of the intrusion. 73 
69. See United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1883 (White, J., dissenting); 
United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1348-52 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. 
Ct. 2991 (1980) (Oakes, J., dissenting). Most significantly, Dunaway v. New York, 442 
U.S. 200 (1979), seemed to say that Terry has been interpreted too generously. 
Referring to Terry, the Court stated that "it defined a special category of Fourth 
Amendment 'seizures' so substantially less intrusive than arrests that the general rule 
requiring probable cause ... could be replaced by a balancing test." This test exam­
ines specific facts measured against an objective standard. ld. at 209-10. A predeter­
mined check list which is invoked in lieu of a balancing test further weakens the al­
ready diluted reasonable suspicion test and threatens to swallow the general rule 
that fourth amendment seizures are reasonable only if based on probable cause. See 
generally Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 
(1974); Ingram, Are Airport Searches Still Reasonable?, 44 J. AIR L. & COMM. 131 
(1978). 
70. See notes 64 & 65 supra. 
71. Most telling is the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Mendenhall, 
100 S. Ct. at 1870, in which the Court emphasized that the "specially trained agents" 
acted pursuant to "a well-planned, and effective, federal law enforcement program." 
ld. at 1883. See also United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 100 S. Ct. 2991 (1980). 
72. A determination of reasonableness is reached by balancing the need for the 
stop against the gravity of the intrusion. 392 U.S. at 21. The need for the stop de­
pends, inter alia, upon the seriousness of the offense, the consequences of delay, 
and the likelihood of the detainee's involvement. ld. Furthermore, only specific facts 
can be considered in striking this balance. ld. The analysis set forth by the Forero­
Rincon court, 626 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1980), and the Vasquez court, 612 F.2d 1338 (2d 
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2991 (1980), seems to equate reasonable suspicion 
with the unparticularized hunches of trained agents. See 100 S. Ct. at 1887 (White, J., 
dissenting). 
73. See United States v. Forero-Rincon, 626 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1980). "The stop 
was clearly only minimally intrusive. It lasted only five to ten minutes and occurred 
in a public place. There is no suggestion that Iglesias intimidated, harassed or hu­
miliated Yepes or Forero." ld. at 224. United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1343 
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Terry, however, made it clear that only specific and articulable 
facts would be considered in striking the balance between the need 
for a stop and the gravity of the intrusion. 74 The narrow parame­
ters of Tern) require more than suspicion. Some reasonable ground 
must be shown for singling out the person stopped as one who was 
involved in, or was about to become involved in, criminal activ­
ity.75 The expectations of Terry require that even minimal intru­
sions must be based upon specific facts and the rational inferences 
that can be drawn from those facts. 76 
The trend, however, is apparent: the most recent cases con­
tain fewer and fewer objective facts linking a suspect to drug smug­
gling. Consequently, an agent's perception of a suspect's objec­
tively neutral conduct and the collective experience and expertise 
of the DEA take on added importance. 77 The question remains, 
however, whether it is wise to reduce Terry to a standard which 
inextricably ties the standard of reasonableness to a list of charac­
teristics and behavioral traits that purportedly distinguishes the 
guilty from the innocent. 78 A further question is whether judicial 
deference to agency experience supports the existence of an insti­
tutional standard which encourages making airport stops. 
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2991 (1980); United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 
494, 500 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Magda, 547 F.2d 756, 759 (2d Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878 (1977). 
74. 392 U.S. at 21. See also Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); United States v. Price, 599 F.2d 494 (2d Cir. 1979). 
See generally notes 37-40 & 56-59 supra. 
75. 392 U.S. at 21-22. The Terry Court stated that: 
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is 
assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the 
laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who 
must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of 
the particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative 
that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts avail­
able to the officer at the moment of the seizure or search 'warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate? 
Id. at 21-22 (footnote & citations omitted). See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 
209 (1979). See also Ybarra v. Illinois 444 U.S. 85 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 
47 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). See generally note 69 supra. 
76. See notes 33-40 supra. 
77. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 17. Furthermore, the Terry Court cautioned that 
if intrusions could be based upon something less than specific facts measured against 
an objective standard, they would eventually be allowed on the basis of inarticulated 
hunches. Id. at 22. See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Beck v. 
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United 
States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959). 
78. This standard is in contradistinction to the balancing test set forth in Terry. 
See notes 56-59, 69, 73 & 74 supra. 
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IV. UNITED STATES V. MENDENHALL 

The Supreme Court, in United States v. Mendenhall,79 had 
the opportunity to answer these questions and to clarify the role of 
the drug courier profile vis-a-vis the requirement of specific and 
articulable facts dictated by Terry. The Court, however, did little 
to clarify the confusion surrounding airport investigatory stopS.80 
The Court upheld the agents' conduct in initially approaching 
Mendenhall, asking to see her ticket and identification, and then 
requesting her to accompany them to the DEA office for ques­
tioning and a strip search. 81 The agents' conduct, it was explained, 
did not amount to an arrest or a Terry stop: it was viewed as an 
encounter that intruded upon no constitutionally protected inter­
est. 82 The Court adhered to the view that constitutional safeguards 
are to be invoked only if an intrusion amounts to a seizure, that is, 
when freedom of movement is restrained. 83 Because Mendenhall 
79. 100 S. Ct. at 1870. 
80. Few airport stop cases hinged their decisions on the fact that the brief en­
counter between the agent and citizen involved no seizure or stop and therefore was 
beyond the pale of constitutional scrutiny. See note 10 supra. But see United States 
v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1979). Indeed, most courts stress the de minimis 
nature of the intrusion', but then rely upon an examination of facts to support a find­
ing of reasonable suspicion. See notes 63 & 73 supra and accompanying text. Most 
significantly, case law is replete with the finding that an "investigatory stop" ordi­
narily occurs when an agent approaches the individual, identifies himself, and asks 
the suspect to produce identification or explain his actions. See United States v. 
Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 31 n.3 (2d Cir. 1980) and cases cited therein. The 
government, more often than not, has conceded this point. See, e.g., United States v. 
Roundtree, 596 F.2d 672, 674 n.l (5th Cir. 1979). The Terry Court never explicitly 
defined the line between investigatory stops, minimal intrusions, and arrests. In­
deed, the Court never spoke to the issue of the propriety of an investigatory stop 
based upon less than probable case: it dealt with a frisk for weapons. 392 U.S. at 19 
n.16. Subsequent case law has sought to clarify this issue. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 
47 (1979), has at least partially answered the question concerning what constitutes a 
seizure. The Brown Court explained that "when the officers detained appellant for 
the purpose of requiring him to identify himself, they performed a seizure of his per­
son subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment." [d. at 50. Indeed, it was 
only because certain intrusions fell so far short of the kind of intrusion associated 
with an arrest that the Supreme Court felt constrained to depart from the long­
prevailing standard of probable cause. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 
(1979). See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); United States 
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
81. United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 1873-74. 
82. [d. at 1878. 
83. [d. at 1877. See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); United States 
v. Almond, 565 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1979); United 
States v. Pope, 561 F.2d 663 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. McCain, 556 F.2d 253 
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consented to her search, there was no need to examine the func­
tion of the drug courier profile. The Court held that the agents 
acted lawfully regardless of whether there was any reasonable 
ground for suspecting Mendenhall of criminal activity. 
In concurring, Justice Powell, with whom Chief Justice Burger 
and Justice Blackmun joined, offered a second perspective. 84 They 
found that the fourth amendment was implicated and that the in­
trusion constituted a valid Terry stop in light of the defendant's be­
havior.85 In analyzing the reasonableness of the stop, the concur­
ring Justices took into account three factors: The public interest 
served by the seizure;86 the minimal scope of the intrusion;87 and 
the objective facts upon which the agents relied. 88 In so doing, 
they paralleled the inquiry set forth in Terry. Yet, in concluding 
that the agents possessed articulable SuspICIOn in light of 
Mendenhall's conduct, the concurring Justices accepted behavior 
which conformed to the loose grouping of characteristics reminis­
cent of the drug courier profile as the basis for the agents' suspi­
cion. 89 Most significantly, their finding that the fourth amendment 
was not transgressed was based, in part, upon the fact that "spe­
cially trained agents acted pursuant to a well-planned, and effec­
tive, federal law enforcement program. "90 
Taken as a whole, Mendenhall seems inconsistent with Terry91 
(5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Brunson, 549 F.2d 348 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 842 (1977); United States v. Ward, 488 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1973). An examination 
of these cases indicates that the concept of "restraint of movement" often involves 
semantics and ambiguities. It thus seems foolhardy to preclude all constitutional reg­
ulation when an officer seeks to question an individual for investigatory purposes on 
the basis of whether the individual was free to ignore the officer and proceed on his 
way. 
84. 100 S. Ct. at 1880. 
85. Id. at 1881-83. 
86. The Court explained that the public has a compelling interest in detecting 
those who traffic in deadly drugs. Id. at 1881. 
87. The Court explained that the intrusion in this case was "quite modest." 
Here, the stop was in a public place, no weapons were displayed, and the agents 
identified themselves and asked brief questions. Id. at 1881-82. 
88. The agents observed an individual who appeared very nervous, deplaned 
only after all other passengers had left the aircraft, scanned the gate area, walked 
very slowly toward the baggage area, claimed no baggage, and asked a skycap for di­
rections to the Eastern Airlines ticket counter while carrying an American Airlines 
ticket for a flight from Detroit to Pittsburgh. Id. at 1882. 
89. Compare note 88 supra and accompanying text with note 49 supra and ac­
companying text. 
90. 100 S. Ct. at 1883. See notes 71 & 72 supra and accompanying text. 
91. Terry specifically enunciated a balancing test based upon an analysis of ob­
jective facts for those encounters which fall far short of the kind of intrusion asso­
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and with the more recent cases which indicate that fourth amend­
ment requirements are triggered even when the purpose of a stop 
is limited and the detention is brief. 92 Indeed, in Dllnmwy v. Nell; 
York,93 the United States Supreme Court made it clear that Terry 
represented a "narrow exception" to the general rule that probable 
cause must be present to make fourth amendment seizures reason­
able. The narrow Terry exception was drawn to accommodate 
those intrusions which fell "so far short" of the kind of intrusion as­
sociated with an arrest. 94 
The suggestion of the Mendenhall Court that the defendant 
was not seized, since a reasonable person would have believed that 
she was free to leave, is inconsistent with the rationale of Terry 
and Dunaway. The conclusions that no seizure occurred and that 
the defendant consented to all that transpired pinpoint the dangers 
inherent in the Mendenhall analysis. In essence, since the strip 
search was not preceded by an impermissible seizure or stop, the 
Court believed it was impossible to argue that the subsequent 
consent was tainted by an unlawful detention. In contrast, Terry 
does not rely on mere "consent," an approach which has tremen­
dous potential for abuse. A finding that the initial contact 
amounted to an intrusion upon a constitutionally protected interest 
would have triggered a balancing analysis consistent with the re­
quirements of Terry. 
Indeed, the recent cases dealing with law enforcement intru­
sions upon privacy and liberty interests in areas other than airport 
searches reject any suggestion that even the most minimal stop 
may be judged by anything short of specific facts based upon an 
ciated with an arrest. 392 U.S. at 21-22. Thereafter, the reasonableness of a particular 
stop was gauged by comparing the degree of the intrusion with the grounds for the 
suspicion. Id. at 17-19. The need for a balancing analysis, however, in the area of en­
counters between citizens and police for investigatory questioning perforce is dis­
pensed with once such encounters are placed beyond the pale of constitutional regu­
lation. [d. at 19 n.16. Secondly, Terry emphasized that the wiser course is to govern 
all police intrusions by constitutional regulation. Id. at 18 n.15. Accord, Brown v. 
Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
92. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (detention for identification trig­
gered the requirements of the fourth amendment); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 
(1979) (stop of motorist to check driver's license and registration); United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (detention by border patrol at permanent check 
points a lesser intrusion on fourth amendment rights); United States v. Brignoni­
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (stops by roving border patrols held to intrude on fourth 
amendment rights). See also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (arrest and 
interrogation on insufficient information and lack of probable cause). 
93. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). 
94. Id. at 212. 
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objective standard of review,95 To illustrate, notwithstanding im­
portant governmental interests, roving border patrols96 and random 
automobile stops97 have been held to violate the fourth amend­
ment insofar as the procedures sanction police conduct which is not 
based upon articulable suspicion. The courts in those cases empha­
sized that the lack of an appropriate factual basis for suspecting a 
particular individual, prompted by mere inarticulable hunches, in­
95. Courts have rejected stops based upon the hunches of an agent in a multi­
plicity of cases. Similar issues also have arisen in the following cases: United States 
v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 
(1975) (border searches); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), Camara v. 
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) 
(inspection of premises); United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970) (inspec­
tion of packages); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) and United States v. Di RE, 
332 U.S. 581 (1948) (generalized searches). But see United States v. Dionisio, 410 
U.S. 1 (1973); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973). The Court in these two 
cases emphasized that a subpoena to appear before a grand jury is not a seizure in 
the fourth amendment sense and that the procurement of exemplars is not a search 
because no person can have a reasonable expectation that others will not know the 
characteristics of his voice or handwriting. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 9, 
13; United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. at 21. 
96. In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), agents' practice 
of conducting roving border patrols in areas near the international border was held 
to violate the fourth amendment. Notwithstanding the important government in­
terests involved, the Court analogized the roving patrol stop to a Terry stop and 
found that the officers on roving patrol could detain vehicles only if they were aware 
of specific articulable facts, which reasonably warranted the suspicion that the vehi­
cle contained illegal aliens. Id. at 881. One year later, the Court again was faced 
with the constitutionality of border patrol stops. In United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 
428 U.S. 543 (1976), the Court sustained the constitutionality of border patrol 
checkpoint operations. In this case, the Court felt compelled to sanction the fixed 
checkpoint operation because of the lesser intrusion upon the motorists' fourth 
amendment interests. Id. at 557. The method of intrusion, when examined in light of 
the concerns or fears experienced by lawful travelers, was deemed to be appreciably 
less in the case of a checkpoint stop than in a roving patrol stop. Id. at 558. Cer­
tainly, airport stops are more akin to roving patrols than to fixed checkpoint stops. 
Furthermore, the issue regarding the drug courier profile involves domestic air travel 
as opposed to international border matters. 
97. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In Prouse, the constitutionality of 
investigatory stops of automobiles was at issue. The government analogized random 
stops of automobiles to the checkpoint stops sanctioned in United States v. Martinez­
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 656-57. The Court re­
jected this proposition and found that, except in those situations in which there is at 
least an articulable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed, stopping an automobile in 
order to check the driver's license is unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Id. 
at 663. The Court explained that an individual is not shorn of all fourth amendment 
protection when he steps from his home onto a public sidewalk or into an automo­
bile. [d. But see Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (police officer was justified 
in stopping an automobile based solely on a reliable informant's tip that the occu­
pant was armed). 
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vites intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights. 98 Similarly, 
even when minimal police intrusions are based on something more 
palpable than random selection, the courts nonetheless apply a 
Terry balancing analysis. 99 For example, in a case decided in 1979, 
Brown v. Texas,100 the United States Supreme Court overturned 
the conviction of a man who was initially stopped in an alley lo­
cated in a high crime area, in part because he looked "suspi­
cious. "101 The Court held that requiring the defendant to identify 
himself constituted a seizure subject to the objective factfinding 
requirement of the fourth amendment. 102 
The government may predicate a search upon something less 
than reasonable suspicion in one area, the customs search. In 
United States v. Ramsey, 103 the United States Supreme Court 
noted that a person crossing our national boundaries may be re­
quired to submit to a search of his baggage and personal effects 
and may be subjected to questioning, even though the intrusions 
are not based upon even the slightest suspicion. Historically, this 
sort of intrusion has been justified by national security. Signifi­
cantly, even in the case of a customs search, the courts are quick 
to impose two limits: First, a stop-and-search initiated beyond the 
parameters of the customs area requires reasonable suspicion;104 
second, a search of the person that goes beyond search of personal 
effects requires reasonable suspicion. 105 Thus, even concern with 
national protection does not give the government an unlimited 
right to search. Moreover, to extend the unique standard applica­
ble to a customs search to the search of a domestic airline passen­
ger would undermine the protections afforded by the Constitution. 
An individual has the option of not leaving or not entering this 
country. If we impose a customs search standard onto domestic 
98. See generally Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, .726 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Rios v. United States, 364 
U.S. 253 (1960). 
99. See note 95 supra. 
100. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
101. ld. In Brown, two officers observed the defendant and another man walk 
away from one another in an alley located in an area with a high incidence of drug 
traffic. ld. at 48-49. They stopped the defendant and asked him to identify himself 
and to explain what he was doing. ld. When the defendant refused to identify himself, 
he was arrested. ld. at 49. 
102. [d. at 51. 
103. 431 U.S. 606 (1977). 
104. United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 1973 (2d Cir. 1978). 
105. [d. 
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travel, however, a chilling effect on rights secured by the Constitu­
tion could result. 
Case law indicates that even minimal governmental intrusions 
traditionally have triggered the protections of the fourth amend­
ment, requiring a determination as to the legality of the intrusion. 
This determination is made by balancing the need for the particu­
lar stop against the gravity of the intrusion and by considering only 
specific and articulable facts in light of all the circumstances. I06 
From an examination of the case law, however, it appears that 
courts employ one standard for airport stops and another for auto­
mobile and street stopS.I07 Unless it can be explained why an air­
port is so nmdamentally different from a highway, public forum, or 
high crime area, the departure seems unwarranted. 
In Reid v. Georgia l08 the United States Supreme Court ap­
peared implicitly to deny the vitality of the Mendenhall analysis. 
Indeed, the facts of Reid are similar to the facts of Mendenhall. In 
Reid, the petitioner arrived on an airline flight from Florida in the 
early morning hours. After deplaning, a man who carried luggage 
identical to the petitioner's remained separate from him, yet the 
petitioner occasionally looked back in his direction. Finally, the 
two men spoke briefly to one another and left the terminal build­
ing. The officer then approached them, asked several questions, 
and asked them to return to the terminal for a search of their lug­
gage. One bag was found to contain cocaine. 
In reversing the lower court's decision that the officer 
"lawfully seized" the petitioner, the Supreme Court made two in­
teresting observations. First, the Court explicitly stated that "any" 
curtailment of a person's liberty by the police must be supported 
by reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person seized is 
engaged in criminal activity.lo9 Second, the Court concluded "as a 
matter of law" that the agent, on the basis of these facts, could not 
reasonably have suspected the petitioner of criminal activity.1l0 
The Court reasoned that if reasonable suspicion could arise from 
106. See notes 95-97, 101 & 102 supra and accompanying text. 
107. Compare Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) and Brown v. Texas, 443 
U.S. 47 (1979) and Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) and United States v. 
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) with United States v. Mendenhall, 100 S. Ct. at 
1870 and United States v. Forero-Rincon, 626 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1980) and United 
States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2991 (1980). 
108. 100 S. Ct. 2752 (1980). 
109. Id. at 2753. 
llO. Id. at 2754. 
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such observations, a large category of innocent travelers would be 
subjected to virtually random seizures. 1l1 
It is important to note that in Mendenhall the petitioner alleg­
edly acquiesced to the wishes of the officer, while in Reid the peti­
tioner began to return to the terminal with the officer but then 
turned away and attempted to flee. It would be illogical to assert 
that an initial contact, following consent to a search, did not 
amount to a seizure which would implicate the fourth amendment, 
while contact following an attempt to flee would implicate the 
fourth amendment. Further, the Court stated that insofar as the 
lower court decision rested on the determination that the officer 
"lawfully seized" the petitioner, the judgment had to be reversed. 
V. A RECOMMENDED ApPROACH 
In essence, the investigatory stop-and-frisk decisions since 
Terry represent a sliding scale approach to the fourth amendment 
in that police action without probable cause is sanctioned as long as 
it is based upon specific and articulable facts and is not unreason­
ably intrusive. U2 Under the sliding scale analysis of the fourth 
amendment, use of the drug courier profile cannot be sustained, for 
its applicability does not depend upon specific and articulable facts. 
Clearly, suspicion based on an inchoate and unparticularized hunch, 
rather than on specific and reasonable facts, cannot justify a Terry 
stop.u3 Indeed, nothing in the history of the fourth amendment 
can be interpreted to give an officer free rein to act on his own 
suspicions. 114 The fact that an officer is experienced does not re­
quire a court to accept all his suspicions as reasonable. u5 Simi­
111. ld. 
112. Since the evidence needed to make a stop was not of the same degree of 
conclusiveness as that required for an arrest, the Terry Court opted for a balancing 
test which examined the reasonableness of a particular seizure on the basis of the 
particular circumstances. 392 U.S. at 21. Furthermore, the scope of the particular in­
trusion, in light of all the exigencies of the case, was made a central element in the 
analysis of reasonableness. lei. at 17-18. 
113. See notes 35-40 & 98 supra and accompanying text. 
114. Indeed, the purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect against arbi­
trary intrusions. See United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); Berger v. New York, 
388 U.S. 41 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Wolf v. Colo­
rado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Gillard v. Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978). 
115. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979). The training and expertise of spe­
cial agents do not serve as a substitute for the courts' review of specific facts. See United 
States·v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Price, 
599 F.2d 494, 500 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320, 323-24 (2d Cir. 
1979); United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.2d 717, 720 (6th Cir. 1977). The Price court 
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larly, a court should not automatically accept as reasonable the sus­
picions enumerated by an agency when they are based solely upon 
that agency's collective experience. On the contrary, it is well es­
tablished that the basis of police action must be such that it can be 
reviewed judicially by an objective standard. 116 When the govern­
ment is unable to articulate the specific facts which point to an in­
dividual's involvement in criminal activity, even if the individual is 
present at the place of the criminal act,117 the investigatory stop­
and-frisk must be unlawful. 118 
The analysis set forth in Mendenhall119 departs drastically from 
the principles recently enunciated in the area of stop-and-frisk. 12o 
For whether a general investigatory airport encounter is deemed to 
fall outside the parameters of the fourth amendment, or whether 
reasonable suspicion can be based upon a drug courier profile, the 
Court has placed special police conduct beyond the scope of consti­
tutional examination. The danger of adopting such a rigid model of 
regulation for airport stops is twofold. 121 First, it isolates certain in-
explained that awareness of the unusual and a proper resolve to keep a sharp eye are 
not the same as an articulated suspicion of criminal conduct. 599 F.2d at 500 n.7. 
116. See United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1980); 
United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1342 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 
2991 (1980); United States v. Roundtree, 596 F.2d 672, 674 (5th Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Rico, 594 F.2d 320, 324 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Scott, 545 F.2d 38, 
39 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977). See generally notes 37, 39 & 40 su­
pra and accompanying text. 
117. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979). 
118. In Ybarra, the Court held that mere presence at the place of the criminal 
act was not a reasonable justification for conducting a Terry frisk. The police in this 
case possessed a valid warrant to search a tavern. Upon entering the tavern, the offi­
cers advised those present that they were going to conduct a cursory search for 
weapons. [d. at 88. During the course of one such frisk, the officers retrieved a ciga­
rette pack containing heroin. [d. at 89. The Court held the frisk unconstitutional 
since it was not supported by a reasonable belief that Ybarra was armed. "In short, 
the state is unable to articulate any specific fact that would have justified a police of­
ficer at the scene in even suspecting that Ybarra was armed and dangerous." [d. at 
93. Furthermore, the Court stressed that nothing in Terry can be understood to allow 
a generalized cursory search. Id. at 94. Similar safeguards should apply to general in­
vestigatory stops. 
119. Mendenhall implicitly sets forth two propositions, the potential ramifica­
tions of which are ominous. First, general investigatory questioning by police, in 
some situations, falls beyond the scope of constitutional regulation. 100 S. Ct. at 
1876. Second, the concurring Justices found reasonable suspicion on facts which mir­
rored the characteristics of a drug courier profile. [d. at 1881-82. 
120. See notes 91 & 95-106 supra and accompanying text. 
121. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 17. Indeed, the danger of holding that general 
investigatory questioning by Drug Enforcement Administration agents transcends 
constitutional scrutiny cannot be overstated. The snowball effect of Mendenhall may 
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itial stages of contact between the officer and the citizen from con­
stitutional scrutiny. Second, it obscures the utility of constraints 
placed upon the scope of police actions by means of constitutional 
regulation. 
It therefore seems the wiser course to govern all general in­
vestigatory intrusions by fourth amendment standards. 122 This limi­
tation would not preclude police action. Instead, it would subject 
law enforcement conduct to the standard of reasonableness and 
would establish the scope of the particular intrusion as a central el­
ement in the analysis. 123 
Terry and its progeny indicate that the proper inquiry con­
cerning police intrusions based on less than probable cause must 
focus squarely on the dangers and demands of a particular situa­
tion. 124 In adopting this "totality of the circumstances" approach to 
general investigatory stops, a vast array of police conduct has been 
subjected to the general proscriptions of the fourth amendment. 125 
The fourth amendment consequently has become a vehicle for 
deterring a wide range of police misconduct. 126 
The Mendenhall Court, however, focused its analysis upon the 
distinctions between intrusive behavior and nonintrusive behavior 
and thereby displaced the Terry balancing test with a rigid model 
of regulation. The implications are ominous. Once special police 
conduct is sanctioned in airports, it also may be tolerated in other 
public places. The risk of arbitrary and abusive practices increases 
enormously when the encounters between citizens and police are 
not judged by objective criteria examined in light of all the circum­
stances. 127 
be enormous, for it now can be invoked by government attorneys and judges in 
resolving matters which move beyond the corridors of an airport. 
122. [d. at 18 n.15. 
123. Thus, the determination of reasonableness would be reached by balancing 
the need for the stop against the gravity of the intmsion which the stop entailed. [d. 
at 20-21. See generally note 112 supra. 
124. See notes 91-106 supra and accompanying text. 
125. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 1. The Terry Court rejected the notion that 
the fourth amendment did not come into playas a limitation on police conduct faIl­
ing short of an arrest. Instead, the Court stressed the importance of limiting the 
scope, as well as the initiation, of police action through constitutional regulation. [d. 
at 17, 19. . 
126. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 
47 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 
422 U.S. 873 (1975). 
127. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 200; Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 
721 (1969); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). The Johnson Court rea­
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VI. CONCLUSION 
While a set of facts may arise which coincide with certain pro­
file characteristics claimed to constitute reasonable suspicion, the 
drug courier profile in a particular case may not provide the spe­
cific and articulable facts that reasonably warrant an investigatory 
stop. In judging the constitutionality of these profiles, courts 
should evaluate even minimal intrusions on a person's freedom by 
nothing less than the reasonableness requirement of the fourth 
amendment. The fourth amendment would be appreciably dam­
aged if the validity of a stop could be proven by something less 
than evidence of reasonable grounds for suspecting a particular 
person of a crime. Due to the potential erosion of fourth amend­
ment protection, it would be unwise to relax the requirements of 
Terry to meet the exigencies of airport drug trafficking. 
The premises set forth in Terry clearly indicate the need for a 
rational link between otherwise innocent behavior and drug-related 
activity.128 While the usefulness of the profile in law enforcement 
activity is apparent, courts should be unwilling to depart from Ter­
ry's requirement of objective factfInding. Most significantly, the 
claim that the fourth amendment is not implicated by general in­
vestigatory stops used at airports sets a dangerous precedent. 
Without constitutional regulation in this area, an officer's behavior 
would be unhampered by the constraints of the Constitution while 
innocent acts frequently associated with air travel could assume a 
suspicious tint in the eyes of law enforcement officers faced with 
the serious problem of narcotics smuggling. A finding, either ex­
plicitly or implicitly, that an airport Terry stop is justified solely on 
the basis of a drug courier profile may trigger the development of 
similar profiles for other kinds of travel or social behavior. Expan­
sion of Mendenhall to other areas of law enforcement would dimin­
ish the protections against arbitrary governmental interference and 
would spread a chilling effect upon the very rights safeguarded by 
the Constitution. 
soned that the intent of the framers of the Constitution could all too easily disappear 
in the consideration and balancing of the multifarious circumstances presented by 
different cases when the balancing is done in the first instance by police officers en­
gaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. [d. at 14. 
128. For a thorough discussion on this point, see United States v. Buenaventura­
Ariza, 615 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1980). See also notes 35-40, 56 & 61 supra and accom­
panying text. 
